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INTRODUCTION
Everybody hates intellectual property trolls. They are
parasites, who abuse intellectual property by forcing innovators
to pay an unjust toll. Even worse are intellectual property
pirates. They are thieves, who steal intellectual property by
using it without the consent of its owner. By contrast, everybody
loves innovators. They are farmers, entitled to reap what they
have sown and enjoy the fruits of their labor.
But trolls, pirates, and farmers are metaphors. A "troll"
abuses intellectual property only if its ownership or use of that
intellectual property is unjustified, a "pirate" steals intellectual
property only if the ownership of that intellectual property is
justified, and a "farmer" is entitled to own intellectual property
rights only to the extent that they are justified.
In Illness as Metaphor, Susan Sontag observed that illness
has historically been understood metaphorically as an expression
of the personality of the patient.1 Specifically, tuberculosis was
used as a metaphor for refinement and cancer as a metaphor for
corruption. Tuberculosis was the bohemian disease, associated
with creativity and expression; cancer was the bourgeois disease,
associated with timidity and repression.
Sontag objected to this metaphorical understanding of
disease, because illness is not a metaphor, but a physiological
phenomenon. We do not create disease, but are afflicted by it.
She argued that we cannot understand illness until we abstain
from thinking about it metaphorically:
My point is that illness is not a metaphor, and that the most truthful
way of regarding illness-and the healthiest way of being ill-is one
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky School of Law. J.D., New York
University School of Law, 2005; M.F.A., San Francisco Art Institute, 1997; B.A.,
University of California, Berkeley, 1995. Thanks to the participants in this conference
and the University of New Hampshire IP Scholars' Roundtable, Irina Manta, Christina
Mulligan, Jake Linford, Michael Burstein, Robert Wagner, Felix Wu, Brian Lee,
Christopher Beauchamp, Janet Moore, Andrew Woods, Albertina Antognini, Johnny
Schmidt, and Paul Salamanca for their helpful comments.
1 SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR 30 (1978).
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most purified of, most resistant to, metaphoric thinking. Yet it is
hardly possible to take up one's residence in the kingdom of the ill
unprejudiced by the lurid metaphors with which it has been
landscaped. It is toward an elucidation of those metaphors, and a
liberation from them, that I dedicate this inquiry.2
The same is true of intellectual property, because the rhetoric
of intellectual property is metaphorical.3 In theory, intellectual
property is justified on welfarist grounds, because it solves
market failures in innovation and thereby increases the public
surplus. But in practice, the scope of intellectual property rights
is unrelated to their ostensible welfarist justification. Intellectual
property metaphors prevent us from understanding intellectual
property by obscuring the lack of connection between its
theoretical justification and its actual scope.
Notably, illness metaphors and intellectual property
metaphors even have a parallel structure. Much as tuberculosis
became a metaphor for expression and cancer became a metaphor
for repression, innovators have become a metaphor for expression
and pirates and trolls have become metaphors for repression.
But intellectual property metaphors are even more
pernicious than illness metaphors. The problem with illness
metaphors is that they are false. Illness metaphors propose that
disease is a product of uncontrolled emotion. But disease is not a
product of emotion and cannot be cured by controlling our
emotions. As a result, illness metaphors prevent us from
understanding disease by obscuring its true physiological causes.
The problem with intellectual property metaphors is that
they obscure the welfarist justification for intellectual property
and encourage the creation of intellectual property rights
inconsistent with that justification. Illness is a physiological
phenomenon, but intellectual property is a political phenomenon.
We do not create illness, but we do create intellectual property.
As a result, intellectual property metaphors not only obscure the
justification for intellectual property, but also induce us to grant
intellectual property rights that are incompatible with that
justification.
Intellectual property metaphors encourage us to apply
property heuristics that promote the efficient regulation of
rivalrous goods to the regulation of non-rivalrous goods. The
metaphors are compelling because they evoke familiar heuristics,
but their rhetoric obscures the fact that the justification for
2 Id. at 3-4.
3 See generally Patricia Loughlan, Pirates, Parasites, Reapers, Sowers, Fruits,
Foxes... The Metaphors of Intellectual Property, 28 SYDNEY L. REV. 211 (2006).
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creating property rights in rivalrous and non-rivalrous goods is
totally different. Property rights that increase social welfare
when applied to rivalrous property may decrease social welfare
when applied to non-rivalrous property. Intellectual property
metaphors induce us to ignore efficiency, by taking property
rights for granted.
I. THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Intellectual property provides exclusive rights to use ideas,
expressions, and marks, among other things. Those exclusive
rights are in tension with antitrust law and the right to free
expression protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the
proper scope of those rights depends on the justification for
intellectual property.
A. The Economic Theory of Intellectual Property
The prevailing theory of intellectual property is the economic
theory, which holds that intellectual property is justified because
it solves market failures caused by free riding and transaction
costs. Under the economic theory, patents and copyrights solve
market failures caused by free riding by indirectly subsidizing
innovation. Other forms of intellectual property, like trademarks
and trade secrets, also solve market failures caused by
transaction costs. 4
A market failure exists when the market allocation of a good.
is not economically efficient. Free riding and transaction costs
cause market failures by preventing the efficient allocation of-
goods. Free riding, or the ability to consume a good without
paying the marginal cost of production, causes market failures by
creating an incentive to overuse rival goods and underproduce
non-rival goods. Transaction costs, or costs incurred incident to a
market exchange, cause market failures by preventing
economically efficient exchanges.
Innovation is vulnerable to free riding because, in the
absence of intellectual property, it is a non-excludable, non-rival
good. As a consequence, market participants have an incentive to
underinvest in innovation and consume the innovations created
by others, causing market failures. Rational marginal innovators
will invest in innovation only if they can recover their sunk costs
and opportunity costs by charging a premium price for their
goods, but free riding by competitors would quickly reduce the
market price of the good to marginal cost of production.
4 See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS 78 (2013).
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Intellectual property enables marginal innovators to recover
their costs by providing an indirect subsidy in the form of a
limited monopoly to use certain innovations. In other words,
intellectual property solves market failures in innovation by
making it partially excludable and thereby reducing free riding.
Marks and secrets are vulnerable to transaction costs
because, in the absence of intellectual property, information costs
and agency costs would increase. Trademarks reduce information
costs by enabling consumers to identify the source of a product.
Trade secrets reduce agency costs by making it easier for
principals to prevent their agents from disclosing innovations.
Of course, these are only hypotheses. It may or may not be
the case that without intellectual property free riding and
transaction costs would cause underinvestment in innovation
and quality. And it may or may not be the case that intellectual
property actually provides salient incentives to invest in
innovation and quality.
The economic theory is explicitly welfarist, holding that
intellectual property is justified because it increases social
welfare.5 "Intellectual property rights, like other property rights,
are justified where-and only where-the costs of exclusion and
related costs are outweighed by the benefits attending additional
creation or discovery and the benefits of better management,
promotion, and allocation of property."6 Intellectual property
increases social welfare by solving market failures caused by free
riding on innovation, thereby creating an incentive to invest in
innovation. Trademarks and trade secrets increase social welfare
by solving market failures caused by transaction costs, thereby
creating an incentive to invest in quality and innovation. In other
words, intellectual property is justified because it produces a
social benefit that exceeds its social cost.
Under the economic theory, intellectual property is justified
only to the extent that it is efficient. It follows that an
intellectual property right is justified only if the marginal social
cost of granting the right is smaller than the marginal social
benefit generated by granting the right. It follows that the scope
of intellectual property rights must be determined on a
case-by-case basis, because an intellectual property right is
efficient if and only if it causes its recipient to provide a social
5 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Principles ofFairness Versus Human Welfare: On
the Evaluation of Legal Policy 15 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus.
Discussion Paper, Paper No. 277, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=224946.
6 CASS & HYLTON, supra note 4, at 48.
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benefit that is larger than the social cost of the right. In other
words, the economic theory implies that intellectual property is
justified only to the extent that each grant of rights provides the
incentive necessary to cause its recipient to provide a social
benefit and no more, and only if the social benefit is larger than
the social cost of the right.
Of course, in practice, intellectual property rights are not
and cannot be granted on a case-by-case basis. It is probably
impossible to determine whether or not any particular
intellectual property right is efficient, and it would certainly be
impossible to administer an intellectual property system that
required such case-by-case determinations. At best, an
intellectual property system can adopt rules governing
intellectual property rights that will provide the largest net
social benefit.
It is difficult to determine the social benefit created by
intellectual property, especially to the extent that it creates an
incentive to invest in innovation. While solving market failures
caused by transaction costs increases static efficiency, solving
market failures caused by free riding on innovation increases
dynamic efficiency, because innovation is associated with
multiplier effects and often provides an increasing social benefit
over time.
As a result, it could be dynamically efficient for an
intellectual property system to incur large social costs in the
short term, in exchange for larger social benefits in the long
term. However, this "trickle-down" version of the economic theory
does not account for diminishing marginal returns. While the
economic theory predicts that increasing intellectual property
rights will increase innovation, it also predicts that the marginal
value of that innovation will decrease. At some point, the
marginal social cost of increasing intellectual property rights will
exceed the marginal social benefit of innovation.
Some scholars have argued that the existing intellectual
property system may be justified under the economic theory
because it appears to provide a net benefit to society. For
example, Cass and Hylton point to a study showing that
increases in the perceived strength of a country's protection of
intellectual property are associated with increases in that
country's rate of economic growth, acknowledging its
vulnerability to omitted variable bias and failure to show
2015]
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causation.7 Other scholars have conducted similar studies and
arrived at similar conclusions.8
However, many scholars have argued that the existing
intellectual property system is not justified under the economic
theory. Some argue that it is inefficient because the scope of the
intellectual property rights is broader than necessary to solve the
market failures caused by free riding and transaction costs.9
Others argue that the existing intellectual property system is not
just inefficient, but actually reduces social welfare and should be
abolished. 10
B. The Labor and Personality Theories of Intellectual Property
Of course, there are alternative theories of intellectual
property. Most notably, the labor theory advanced by Locke holds
that intellectual property is justified because people have a
natural right to own the fruits of their labor, and the personality
theory advanced by Kant and Hegel holds that intellectual
property is justified because personal autonomy depends on the
ability to control expressions of personhood.1n
While the labor and personality theories may accurately
describe popular intuitions about the justification of intellectual
property, they have serious weaknesses. To begin with, they are
incompatible with the Intellectual Property Clause, which
authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."1 2 The Supreme Court has uniformly held that the
Intellectual Property Clause adopts a welfarist theory of
intellectual property. "The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
7 Id. at 45-46 (citing WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS
REPORT 2002-2003, at 603 (Peter K. Cornelius ed., 2003)).
8 See, e.g., Albert G. Z. Hu & Ivan P. L. Png, Patent Rights and Economic
Growth: Evidence from Cross-Country Panels of Manufacturing Industries 3 (Nov. 9,
2009) (unpublished paper) (CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal
Studies Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1339730
(finding that stronger patent laws are associated with increased economic growth).
9 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 161-62 (2004).
lo See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY 243-44 (2008).
11 See Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW & ECONOMICS 129, 156-63 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest, eds., 2000)
(outlining the labor and personhood theories, among others); see also ROBERT P. MERGES,
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (2011) (providing a more detailed account of the
Lockean and Kantian theories of intellectual property).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through
the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful
Arts.' 1 3
Moreover, neither the labor nor the personality theory
provides a basis for determining whether or not intellectual
property rights are justified. The labor theory justifies granting
property rights in rivalrous goods, in order to prevent the tragedy
of the commons, but cannot justify granting property rights in
non-rivalrous goods. The personality theory justifies granting
property rights in expressions of personhood in order to promote
autonomy, but cannot explain when those property rights are
justified and when they are not.14 Indeed, some scholars have
adopted the labor or personality theory only because they
concluded that the existing intellectual property system is not
justified under the economic theory.15
II. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM
Surprisingly, the constitutional justification for the
intellectual property system is explicitly welfarist, but the actual
scope of intellectual property rights is not determined on
welfarist grounds. Intellectual property advocates uniformly
argue that intellectual property rights are justified because they
promote innovation and reduce transaction costs. Congress
consistently finds that increasing the scope and duration of
intellectual property rights is justified because it will promote
innovation and reduce transaction costs. And the Supreme Court
inevitably defers to those findings when it evaluates the
constitutionality of intellectual property rights. For example,
copyright owners argue that Congress should extend the
copyright term of existing works in order to promote innovation,
Congress extends the copyright term of existing works in order to
promote innovation, and the Supreme Court holds that Congress
could rationally believe that extending the copyright term of
existing works will promote innovation.16
Nowhere along the way does anyone feel obligated to show
that particular intellectual property rights actually promote
innovation or reduce transaction costs. On the contrary, it is
a3 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
14 See CASS & HYLTON, supra note 4, at 17-31 (criticizing the natural rights and
personality theories of intellectual property). But see MERGES, supra note 11 (defending
the natural rights and personality theories of intellectual property).
15 See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 11, at 3-4 ("Try as I might, I simply cannot justify
our current IP system on the basis of verifiable data showing that people are better off
with IP law than they would be without it.") (citing Peter Yu, Anticircumvention and
Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13, 14-15 (2006)).
16 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215-17 (2003).
2015]
Chapman Law Review
taken for granted, and the theory that certain intellectual
property rights may increase public welfare becomes the truism
that all intellectual property rights necessarily increase public
welfare. This rhetorical sleight of hand prevents critical
assessment of the decision to create or expand particular
intellectual property rights, and is obscured by the metaphors
that we use to describe and understand intellectual property
rights.
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY METAPHORS
While the prevailing theory of intellectual property is
welfarist, intellectual property rhetoric is overwhelmingly
metaphorical. 17 Popular discussion of intellectual property
abounds with metaphors: farmers, pirates, trolls, and so on. And
those same metaphors are incorporated into scholarly discussion
of intellectual property.
For example, intellectual property rhetoric uses agrarian
metaphors to describe intellectual property owners. They are
farmers, who expend the "sweat of the brow" in order to "sow the
seeds" of innovation. As a consequence, they are entitled to "reap
what they have sown" and "enjoy the fruits of their labor." The
influence of the labor theory on these agrarian metaphors is
obvious.
By contrast, it uses criminal metaphors to describe
intellectual property infringers. Some infringers are "thieves,"
who "steal" intellectual property and use it for their own
purposes. Others are "pirates," who "hijack" intellectual property
on the "high seas" of commerce and distribute it on the black
market. Still others are "bootleggers," who fix intellectual
property in a tangible medium without permission.
And it uses disease metaphors to describe intellectual
property abusers. They are "parasites," who abuse the
intellectual property system in order to benefit themselves, at the
expense of innovators. Or they are "trolls," who abuse intellectual
property rights by forcing innovators to pay a toll.
These intellectual property metaphors subtly shape our
understanding of intellectual property law. As Lakoff and
Johnson observed, "The essence of metaphor is understanding
and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another."'"
Intellectual property metaphors encourage us to understand and
17 Loughlan, supra note 3, at 223-24.
18 GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 5 (1980) (emphasis
removed).
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experience intellectual property metaphorically, rather than in
relation to its welfarist justification. Agrarian metaphors
encourage us to believe that intellectual property owners are
entitled to internalize all of the social surplus generated by
innovation, even though the economic theory holds that
intellectual property rights are justified only if they are efficient,
and that the scope of intellectual property rights should depend
on marginal incentives. Criminal metaphors encourage us to
believe that intellectual property infringers are wrong, even if
their actions increase public welfare, without decreasing anyone's
welfare. And disease metaphors encourage us to believe that the
justification of intellectual property depends on how it is used,
rather than on whether it increases public welfare.
In fact, intellectual property metaphors obscure the welfarist
justification for intellectual property even when they are used to
explain limitations on the scope of intellectual property. For
example, in Feist v. Rural, the Supreme Court used the "sweat of
the brow" and "fruits of intellectual labor" metaphors to explain
why copyright cannot protect a telephone directory.19 Under the
"sweat of the brow" doctrine, copyright protected factual
compilations, in order to ensure that compilers could "enjoy the
fruits of their labor." Feist rejected the "sweat of the brow"
doctrine, holding that copyright can only protect the original
elements of a work of authorship, and that originality requires
independent creation and creativity. Facts cannot be protected by
copyright, because they are not independently created, so a
factual compilation can be protected by copyright only to the
extent that its selection, coordination, or arrangement of facts is
independently created and has some creative element. The
alphabetical arrangement of a telephone directory lacks any
creative element, so it cannot be protected by copyright. "As a
constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent
elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis
quantum of creativity. Rural's white pages, limited to basic
subscriber information and arranged alphabetically, fall short of
the mark."2 °
However, while Feist held that copyright cannot protect a
telephone directory,21 it implied that copyright can protect a
compilation of facts that incorporates any degree of judgment in
its selection, ordering, or arrangement, no matter how trivial.22
Moreover, while Feist held that copyright cannot protect the
19 See Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340, 346, 359-60 (1991) (emphasis removed).
20 See id. at 363 (emphasis removed).
21 Id. at 340.
22 Id. at 358-59.
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"sweat of the brow" of a compiler of facts, it implicitly assumed
that copyright can protect the "sweat of the brow" of any other
kind of author. The originality doctrine adopted by Feist provides
no basis for denying copyright protection to anything other than
a compilation of facts. In other words, Feist effectively narrowed
the scope of copyright protection in one area, only to expand it in
all others, and considered the welfarist justification for
intellectual property rights only in order to dismiss it as
irrelevant to whether copyright can protect facts.23
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TROLLS
As noted above, intellectual property rhetoric is replete with
metaphors. This Article will focus on the relatively novel "troll"
metaphor, which made its first appearance in the mid-1990s,
became popular in the 2000s, and has recently begun to enter the
vernacular. The relative novelty of the "troll" metaphor provides
an unusual opportunity to observe the emergence and
dissemination of an intellectual property metaphor, to study its
effect on intellectual property policy, and to consider how it
frames our understanding and experience of particular
intellectual property rights and owners. While each intellectual
property metaphor has a unique history and rhetorical content, a
similar analysis of other intellectual property metaphors would
almost certainly provide similar results.
A troll is a mythical monster that lives under a bridge and
charges a toll to use the bridge.24 But what is an "intellectual
property troll"?
A. Patent Trolls
The "troll" metaphor is used primarily in the context of
patent law, in reference to "patent trolls." Apparently, the term
"patent troll" was coined by patent lawyer Paula Natasha Chavez
in a 1994 educational video titled The Patent System. In the
video, Chavez describes owners of broad patents as "patent
trolls," because they can use their patents to collect "tolls" from
other innovators, and depicts a "patent troll" as a scruffy, green
man under a bridge holding a sign reading "PAY HERE TO
CROSS. '2 5
23 See id.
24 Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388 (2006) (No. 05-130), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argu
ment transcripts/05-130.pdf.
25 See The Original Patent Troll Returns, PR NEWSWIRE, http://www.prnews
wire.com/news-releases/the-original-patent-troll-returns-58004897.html (last visited Feb.
16, 2015); ROBERT FLETCHER, INTELL. PROP. INS. SERVS. CORP., A CONTINUED DISCUSSION
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But the term "patent troll" was popularized by Peter Detkin
in 2001. At the time, Detkin was assistant general counsel for
Intel Corporation, which faced a congeries of patent infringement
actions filed by an assortment of companies with a shared
business model of buying and enforcing patents. Detkin referred
to Intel's adversaries as "patent trolls" and kept a collection of
troll dolls on his desk:
Peter Detkin's spin sounds surprisingly like something out of the
Brothers Grimm. In the sleepy village of Santa Clara, there lived a
very wealthy but very frightened giant named Intel. Intel was plagued
by a fearsome band of evil trolls-patent trolls, to be exact-who
wanted a glittering pot of gold in exchange for doing absolutely
nothing. And they were very powerful because they said they owned
the patent on some of the magic Intel used to become rich.26
According to Detkin, "A patent troll is somebody who tries to
make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing and
have no intention of practicing and in most cases never
practiced. 27
Detkin's use of the "patent troll" metaphor quickly caught
on. Industry publications started using the term, and legal
scholars followed suit. The term "patent troll" first appeared in a
law review article in 2002, first appeared in the text of a law
review article in 2004, and first appeared in the title of a law
review article in 2005.28 As of 2015, a Westlaw search for the
term "patent troll" returned almost 1200 hits.
Eventually, general interest journalists recognized a story.
Most notably, WBEZ's This American Life aired an hour-long
episode titled "When Patents Attack!" on July 22, 2011, exploring
the "patent troll" phenomenon.29 And where journalists go,
politics follows. Businesses affected by patent law have formed
an assortment of lobbying groups, most notably "United for
Patent Reform," a collection of technology companies and
ON PATENT TROLLS (2013), available at http://www.patentinsurance.com/custdocs/A%20
Continued%20Discussion%20on%20Patent%20Trolls.pdf; Paula Natasha Chavez, The
Original Patent Troll, YOuTUBE (Jan. 28, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-lO
GoZFzHkhs.
26 Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for Dollars, THE
RECORDER (July 30, 2001), http://www.phonetel.com/pdfs/lwtrolls.pdf.
27 Id.
28 See Gregory F. Sutthiwan, Prosecution Laches as a Defense to Infringement: Just
in Case There Are Any More Submarines Under Water, 1 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 383, 383 (2002) (citing Sandburg, supra note 26); Derek C. Stettner, Meet the Patent
Enforcers, 77 WISCONSIN LAW., Apr. 2004, at 18, 21 (quoting Peter Detkin); Elizabeth D.
Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let's Build a Pit to Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J. L.
& TECH. 367 (2005).
29 When Patents Attack!, THIS AM. LIFE (July 22, 2011), http://www.thisamerican
life.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when.patents.attack.
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retailers.30 Various states have enacted or are considering
"anti-patent troll" legislation.31 Congress has also considered
"anti-patent troll" legislation.32 And President Obama has
identified "patent trolls" as a problem:
[Olne of the biggest problems that we've been working on is how do we
deal with these folks who basically are filing phony patents and are
costing some of our best innovators tons of money in court; or, if they
don't go to court, they end up having to pay them off, even though
they're making a bogus claim just because it's not worth it for you to
incur all the litigation costs. 33
As of January 2015, the "patent troll" metaphor has begun to
enter the vernacular, if it hasn't already arrived. There is a long
Wikipedia entry for "patent troll. ' 34 And a Google search for
"patent troll" returns 887,000 results.35 In any case, almost
everyone seems to agree that patent trolls are a big problem. For
example, one study argues that patent trolls cost society about
$30 billion per year.3 6 Ironically, in 2000, Detkin co-founded
Intellectual Ventures, which is widely considered the apotheosis
of a patent troll. 7
So, what is a patent troll, exactly? It's hard to say.
Conventional wisdom defines "patent trolls" as patent owners
who abuse the patent system in order to force innovators to pay a
toll, as reflected in President Obama's comments. In other words,
"patent trolls" are rent-seekers. But the conventional definition is
obviously inadequate, as it provides no basis for identifying
whether a patent claim is legitimate or abusive. Or rather, to put
it in metaphorical terms, it does not explain how to distinguish
"farmers" from "trolls."
30 UNITED FOR PATENT REFORM, http://www.unitedforpatentreform.com/ (last visited
Feb. 16, 2015).
31 Joe Mullin, Ten States Pass Anti-patent-troll Laws, with More to Come, ARS
TECHNICA (May 15, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/O5/fight-against-patent-
trolls-flags-in-the-senate-but-states-push-ahead/.
32 U.S. H.R. Judiciary Comm., Goodlatte and Eshoo Call on the Senate to Pass
Innovation Act, HOUSE.GOV (July 17, 2014), http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/press.
releases?id=lF8AFODB-E1DD-4A38-AE29-BB3F097746DE.
33 Remarks by the President in a Town Hall on Innovation, Los Angeles, CA,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/201410/091
remarks-president-town -hall-innovation -los -angeles-california.
34 Patent Troll, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilPatenttroll (last updated
Mar. 21, 2015).
35 As of April 14, 2015.
36 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 389 (2014).
37 See INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES FACT SHEET (2014),
available at http://www.intellectualventures.com/assets-docs/fV-Corporate-Fact-Sheet
_Sep2014.pdf.
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Of course, scholars stepped into the gap, albeit with limited
success. Initially, most commentators defined a "patent troll" as a
"non-practicing entity," or an organization that owns a patent,
but does not produce any products.38 In other words, they
adopted Detkin's definition.
However, as the Supreme Court recognized in eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, Detkin's definition is too broad, because
organizations may efficiently specialize in producing and
licensing innovation, rather than in producing products: "For
example, some patent holders, such as university researchers or
self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to license their
patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing
necessary to bring their works to market themselves."39
In theory, there is no reason to favor patents owned by
practicing entities and disfavor patents owned by non-practicing
entities. In fact, non-practicing entities should increase the
efficiency of the patent system. If a patent owner has disclosed a
valuable and patentable innovation, the patent system should be
neutral as to whether the patent owner practices the patent
itself, or licenses it to another party that can practice it more
efficiently. The ability to make that choice may enable some
entities to specialize in generating discoveries. Indeed, many
non-practicing entities are organizations that specialize in
research, like universities.40
As a consequence, most commentators have redefined
"patent trolls" as "patent assertion entities," or non-practicing
entities, with a business model of buying and asserting patents. 41
Critics of patent assertion entities argue that they abuse the
patent system by refusing to bargain with practicing entities,
asserting weak patents, increasing litigation costs, and making
frivolous claims.42 However, most of these criticisms of patent
assertion entities are either unsupported by the evidence or
apply with equal force to practicing entities.
38 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and
Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1577-90 (2009).
39 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006).
40 Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 612 (2008) (concluding that universities are not patent trolls).
41 Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300 (2010) ("The most
visible buyers of patents have been 'patent-assertion entities,' which I define as entities
that use patents primarily to get licensing fees rather than to support the development or
transfer of technology.").
42 Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2129 (2013).
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In theory, both non-practicing entities and patent assertion
entities should increase the efficiency of the patent market by
providing liquidity. The purpose of the patent system is to solve
market failures in innovation by providing an incentive to
marginal innovators. But the patent system cannot provide a
salient incentive unless patents are valuable. If the patent resale
market is limited to practicing entities, the resale value of
patents should decrease, and marginal innovators may be
deterred from investing in innovation. Non-practicing entities
and patent assertion entities can provide the liquidity necessary
to ensure that marginal innovators can obtain the full market
value of their patents. Indeed, many non-practicing entities and
patent assertion entities seem to perform exactly that function,
at least part of the time. 43
The objection that patent assertion entities
disproportionately assert weak patents is not supported by the
evidence. There is no evidence that the patents owned and
asserted by patent assertion entities are weaker than the patents
asserted by practicing entities. In fact, practicing entities and
patent assertion entities have similar litigation records and
appear to assert patents of similar strength. 44 Or rather, similar
weakness. About half of the patents asserted in patent
infringement actions are found invalid.45 This is particularly
remarkable given the presumption of validity, which places the
burden on the defendant to prove that a patent is invalid.
This should come as no surprise. Patents are valuable to
both practicing entities and patent assertion entities, to the
extent that they are enforceable. While both will claim weak
patents to the extent that they are valuable, both prefer strong
patents, because they are more valuable, either as a way of
extracting rents from competitors or from practicing entities. In
fact, if anything, patent assertion entities should have a stronger
preference for strong patents than practicing entities, because
they are more likely to assert their patents.
The objection that patent assertion entities increase
litigation costs, even if true, is a red herring. Patent assertion
entities increase litigation costs because their business is
litigation, or at least the threat thereof. If the patents they assert
are valid, they are entitled to litigate. If the patents are invalid,
43 Id.; David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-practicing
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 428-29 (2014).
44 See generally Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457
(2012).
45 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 76
(2005).
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the problem is not the litigation, but the fact that the patents
were granted in the first place.
In practice, the problem is that many patents are not
justified and should not have been granted. As several scholars
have explained, patent examiners have strong incentives to grant
patent applications, and strong disincentives to deny them. As a
result, the Patent Office grants many unjustified patents, the
most absurd of which are the subject of much ridicule.46 But they
are only the tip of the iceberg. And the fecklessness of the Patent
Office has been exacerbated by the excessively permissive
doctrines developed by the Federal Circuit. While the Supreme
Court has finally begun to push back against the most egregious
abuses, it has done little to address the problem, and remains
unfortunately deferential to both the Patent Office and the
Federal Circuit.47
Patent assertion entities are merely a symptom of these
unjustified and inefficient patents. Practicing entities have an
incentive to enter licensing pools and form cartels with their
competitors because the bulk of their profits come from selling
products to the public. By contrast, patent assertion entities are
indifferent between licensing and litigating their patents. They
have little incentive to enter licensing pools, because they have
no intention of practicing their patents. While practicing entities
collect rents from both the public and their competitors, patent
assertion entities can only collect rents from practicing entities.
The hypocrisy of the practicing entities that complain about
patent trolls is remarkable. They themselves hold and assert,
many more patents of dubious quality than the so-called trolls.
Moreover, in many industries, large companies use shared patent
portfolios to form de facto cartels. Patents become a method of
blocking entry into patent-heavy markets. Members of the cartel
will license to each other, but not to new entrants. As these
entities grow larger and larger, many begin to assert their
patents more aggressively. The result is an avalanche of
inefficient patent litigation over unjustified patents.
Some scholars argue that these patent pools are not cartels
because they reduce transaction costs related to licensing patents
and thereby enable patent owners to use their patents and
46 See PATENTLY SILLY, http://www.patentlysilly.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2015).
47 See generally Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN
BAG 2D 27 (2014).
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produce goods using their discoveries more efficiently.48 While
patent pools reduce transaction costs for patent owners, and
therefore benefit consumers by enabling the use of discoveries
that might otherwise be blocked, it does not follow that the
underlying patents are justified. Indeed, to the extent that the
underlying patents are inefficient, the transactions costs at issue
could be eliminated just as well, and with more public benefit, by
eliminating patent protection.
As many scholars have suggested, if "patent trolls" are a
problem because they tend to own and assert weak patents that
should not have issued, then the patents are the problem, not the
trolls:
Patent trolls alone are not the problem; they are a symptom of larger
problems with the patent system. Treating the symptom will not solve
the problems. In a very real sense, critics have been missing the forest
for the trolls. Exposing the larger problems allows us to contemplate
changes in patent law that will actually tackle the underlying
pathologies of the patent system and the abusive conduct they
enable. 49
Unsurprisingly, the magnitude of the patent troll problem
tracks the difficulty and expense of obtaining patents in various
areas. The technology sector, where patents issue broadly and
costs are relatively low, is rife with patent trolls. The problem is
even worse with respect to software patents, which are overbroad
by definition and almost uniformly of trivial value. By contrast,
in the pharmaceutical sector, where patents issue more narrowly
and costs are very high, the patent troll problem is much more
muted.5 °
So, if "patent trolls" abuse the patent system, what is the
nature of that abuse? To the extent that they assert frivolous
claims, criticism is warranted. But that is less a criticism of their
use of the patent system than an allegation that they engage in
fraud. And fraud is the basis for much of the state legislation
against patent trolls.
But criticism of "patent trolls" on the ground that they assert
unjustified patents is unwarranted, or at least misdirected.
While so-called "patent trolls" may assert unjustified patents, so
do their accusers. Indeed, the patent system is replete with
unjustified patents, precisely because the actual scope of patent
48 Henry Delcamp, Are Patent Pools a Way to Help Patent Owners Enforce Their
Rights?, 41 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 68, 75 (2015); Steven Carlson, Patent Pools and the
Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 379 (1999).
49 Lemley & Melamed, supra note 42, at 2121.
50 Id. at 2172-73.
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protection is unrelated to its theoretical justification. "Patent
trolls" are merely patent owners who refuse to bargain with the
dominant cartel. If they are rent-seekers, so are their targets.
The "troll" metaphor focuses criticism on certain patent
owners on the basis of how they use patents. But it discourages
recognition of the fact that all patent owners are merely
exercising rights granted to them by the Patent Office and by
extension by Congress. In other words, patent trolls are
exercising presumptively valid patents, just like any other patent
owner.
In other words, the "troll" metaphor is a rhetorical way of
deflecting criticism from the patent system as a whole onto
particular patent owners. So-called patent trolls are just
exercising presumptively valid patents, granted by the same
system that grants all other patents. The "troll" metaphor
discourages criticism of the patent system and discourages us
from asking whether the patents exercised by trolls are any
different from the patents exercised by their "victims."
More to the point, the "troll" metaphor encourages us to
internalize and accept as justified industry norms regarding the
use and abuse of patents, without asking whether those norms
promote the interests of the public or the industry.
B. Copyright Trolls
While the "troll" metaphor is overwhelmingly used in
relation to patents, it has gradually been applied to other forms
of intellectual property as well, especially copyright. The term
"copyright troll" first appeared in a law review article in 2011.51
As of April 14, 2015, a Westlaw search for the term "copyright
troll" returns 118 hits, and a Google search returns about 65,000
hits.
Unsurprisingly, a "copyright troll" is generally defined as a
copyright owner who abuses the copyright system. However, no
consensus has emerged as to what counts as "abuse." Some
scholars have used the term to refer to copyright owners who use
the threat of infringement litigation to obtain unjust
settlements.52 Some have used it to refer to copyright owners who
issue infringement notices without determining whether any
51 See Nicole Downing, Using Fair Use to Stop a Copyright Troll from Threatening
Hyperlinkers, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 155, 155 (2011).
52 See Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U.
COLO. L. REV. 53, 55 (2014) (arguing that copyright trolls "exploit enforcement rights by
using the threat of statutory damages to extract quick settlements from secondary users,
regardless of whether the use was legally protected").
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infringement has actually occurred. Some have used it to refer to
copyright owners who use their copyrights to silence speech that
they disapprove of. And some have used it to refer to copyright
owners with improper incentives to litigate.53
It should come as no surprise that scholars have found it
difficult to define "copyright trolls," because the scope of
copyright protection is so much broader and less justified on
welfarist grounds than the scope of patent protection. Unlike
patents, which require an application, have a reasonably short
duration, and-at least theoretically-are only granted if the
application discloses a bona fide innovation, copyrights issue
automatically, last practically forever, and protect all works that
include an original element, no matter how trivial.
While inventors must apply for a patent, authors
automatically receive a copyright in every work of authorship
they create, merely by fixing it in a tangible medium. As a result,
inventors must anticipate whether an invention will become
valuable, and invest in a costly and burdensome process in order
to obtain a patent, which may or may not provide a return on
investment. By contrast, authors can simply wait and see
whether anything they create becomes valuable, and extract a
tax if it does.
As a consequence, the scope of copyright protection is
essentially impossible to defend on welfarist grounds. More often
than not, copyright is irrelevant. Because copyright
automatically protects the original elements of any work of
authorship, the overwhelming majority of copyright owners don't
even realize that they own a copyright. Obviously, copyright
cannot provide an incentive to innovate to those who did not
realize they had created a copyrighted work, or who did not need
the incentive in order to innovate.
And the scope of copyright protection is ridiculously
overbroad. As Justice Breyer has explained, the duration of
copyright protection is wildly excessive.54 But equally as bad, the
adaptation right provides copyright owners the right to claim
returns far in excess of what could possibly be an incentive, and
it enables them to improperly prevent speech. It requires only
the barest shred of cynicism to observe that the subject matter
53 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S.
CAL. L. REV. 723, 730 (2013) (arguing that copyright trolls are copyright owners with
"incentives to sue for copyright infringement [which] emanate from motivations that
diverge rather fundamentally from the social reasons for the very existence of the
copyright system").
54 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 266 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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and scope of copyright protection are drawn to maximize the
opportunities for the copyright owners of already valuable works
to engage in rent seeking, rather than to maximize the incentive
to innovate. Indeed, the adaptation right is on its face calculated
to provide rent-seeking opportunities at the direct expense of
innovation.
While the inefficient and unjustified scope of copyright
protection is mitigated by various exclusions and defenses,
especially the fair use exception, they are effective only on the
margins. As many scholars and judges have observed, the
exclusive rights of copyright owners and the exceptions to
copyright protection are in direct tension with each other. And
while there is some consideration of efficiency in determining
whether or not a particular use of a work is protected by an
exception, the primary purpose of the exceptions is to protect
First Amendment values and prevent the most absurd
implications of the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners.
Once again, the "troll" metaphor performs the rhetorical
function. Copyright owners use copyright to enforce their right to
"enjoy the fruits of their labor." Copyright trolls abuse copyright
to collect a toll. But both are just asserting rights granted by the
Copyright Act. And abuse is a matter of perspective.
Expanding the exceptions to copyright or targeting the most
egregious abuses of copyright protection can at best mitigate the
problem on the margins. Once again, the only way to address the
problem squarely is to re-evaluate the efficiency of the subject
matter and scope of copyright protection, and to make efficiency.,
an explicit requirement of copyright protection.
Of course, as in the case of patents, the efficient level of
copyright protection almost certainly depends on the factors
surrounding a particular work. Different kinds of works have
different levels of sunk costs and opportunity costs, and sell into
very different markets. But restricting the kinds of works that
can be protected, limiting the scope of the exclusive rights of
copyright owners, and reducing the duration of copyright
protection would far more effectively address the problem of
copyright trolls and increase the efficiency of the copyright
system.
C. Trademark Trolls
On its face, it would seem that the term "trademark troll" is
an oxymoron. Indeed, some commentators have argued that
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"there is no such thing as a 'trademark troll.' '5 5 Unlike the other
forms of intellectual property, which pay lip service at best to the
public interest, trademark depends on the public interest.
Trademarks are intended to prevent consumer confusion. In
theory, a trademark can be claimed and enforced only if a
trademark owner proves a likelihood of consumer confusion. A
trademark exists and can be enforced only if the user of the mark
shows that it has secondary meaning to the public and that
protecting the mark will thereby benefit the public by preventing
consumer confusion. This would seem to preclude the inefficiency
and rent seeking that characterize all of the other forms of
intellectual property.
However, some commentators have pointed to "trademark
bullies" as a form of trademark trolls.56 Large trademark owners
may use their financial resources and social clout to assert weak
trademark claims. Likewise, smaller trademark owners may use
weak marks to extract a settlement from a large trademark
owner.
57
Trademark trolls are also a symptom of excessive trademark
protection. Courts are unfortunately sympathetic to trademark
claims that do not present adequate evidence of consumer
confusion. Moreover, they have created doctrines like
disparagement and dilution that are largely inconsistent with the
consumer protection rationale.58
That said, the explicit consumer focus of trademark law
significantly limits the problem of trademark trolls by requiring
an implicit efficiency analysis. This suggests that a similar focus
on efficiency could effectively reduce trolls in other areas of
intellectual property.
D. Design Patent Trolls
Commentators have not yet coined the term "design patent
troll," probably because its redundancy renders it pointless.
55 David H. Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls Barred: Trademark Injunctions
After Ebay, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1037, 1064-65 (2009).
56 Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 Wis. L. REV. 625, 628-29
(2011).
57 Jason Vogel & Jeremy A. Schachter, How Ethics Rules Can Be Used to Address
Trademark Bullying, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 503, 510-11 (2013).
58 See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Circus Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999) ('This case requires us to interpret
and apply the dauntingly elusive concept of trademark 'dilution' as now embodied in the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995."); see also Christine Haight Farley, Why We Are
Confused About the Trademark Dilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 1175, 1175 (2006).
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Design patents effectively combine elements of patent and
copyright into an even less defensible amalgam of the two.
Design patents provide patent-like protection for what are
effectively plans for sculptural objects intended for use in an
industrial context. While design patents have existed since the
first Patent Act, they have recently seen a resurgence in use.
There is no evidence that design patents provide any public
benefit, or even motivate any additional investment in
innovation. Indeed, defenders of design patents tend to ignore the
public benefit that justifies intellectual property, arguing that
design patent owners are entitled to protection simply because
they invested in innovation, whether or not they would have done
so in the absence of design patent protection.
Design patents are routinely granted for designs remarkable
only for their banality and lack of novelty. To make matters
worse, design patent claims are then enforced with an
expansiveness far in excess of what they disclose, in a manner
reminiscent of the derivative works right of copyright.
The predictable result is a deluge of worthless design patents
enforced by competitors against each other, with no discernable
public benefit whatsoever. It is a toxic stew of rent seeking, with
no apparent justification.
E. Publicity Trolls
Likewise, the term "publicity troll" is redundant. The "right
of publicity" consists of state common law rights enabling
individuals who are famous to control the use of their
personality. To the extent that it prohibits fraud or
misrepresentation, it is largely unobjectionable, although it is
unclear that mistakenly believing a celebrity uses or endorses a
product causes a substantial public harm. But to the extent that
the right of publicity exceeds fraud, it is simply an endorsement
of naked rent seeking. In other words, celebrities are trolls by
definition.
F. Trade Secret Trolls
Trade secrets may be one area in which trolls are unusual,
not least because Congress and the courts seem to so disfavor
them. The one area in which trolling is common is the so-called
hot news doctrine, which is little more than naked rent seeking,
blessed by the courts. Thankfully, the hot news doctrine is
heavily disfavored by the courts, and largely unenforced.59
59 See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 906 (2d
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In addition, one might question the use of injunctions in the
case of trade secret protection. If the purpose of trade secret
protection is to prevent misappropriation, it would seem that the
burden of enforcement should be borne by the misappropriator,
rather than the public. Trade secret injunctions effectively force
the public to subside the trade secret owner, and absolve the
misappropriator from making good on some of the damages it
caused. In theory, trade secret protection would be more efficient
if the misappropriator were obligated to pay liquidated damages
and injunctions did not issue.
V. RHETORIC AND METAPHOR
The "troll" metaphor, like other intellectual property
metaphors, enables a form of social cathexis. It justifies the scope
of intellectual property protection by identifying "bad"
intellectual property owners who "abuse" their intellectual
property rights and implicitly distinguishing them from "good"
intellectual property owners, while obscuring the fact that all
intellectual property owners receive and assert similar rights.
Most importantly, the "troll" metaphor once again encourages us
to ignore the lack of connection between the ostensible welfarist
justification of intellectual property rights and the actual scope of
the rights granted.
Scholars have applied similar criticisms to the most
fundamental concepts in intellectual property. For example,
many scholars have criticized the "author" metaphor of copyright,
essentially arguing that it relies on the personality theory of
intellectual property, rather than the economic theory.60 As a
consequence, the scope of copyright protection expands beyond its
welfarist justification. And some scholars have extended that
criticism to the "inventor" metaphor of patent.61
Shubha Ghosh has argued that the "quid pro quo" metaphor
should be abandoned because it "rests on a theory of social
contract that has little relevance to the economics and
Cir. 2011). But see Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
60 See James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37
AM. U. L. REV. 625, 626 (1988); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of 'Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 457 (1991); see also Mark A. Lemley,
Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law
and the Construction of the Information Society, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 874 (1996)
(reviewing James Boyle); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes
Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1322 (1996). See
generally Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal
Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author,' 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984).
61 See generally Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15
GEO. MASON L. REV. 319 (2008).
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administration of patent law. '62 Essentially, Ghosh argues that
patent law is simply a form of regulation intended to increase
public welfare, and that the scope of patent protection should
depend on efficiency, rather than on an exchange metaphor.63
Similarly, Mark Lemley has argued that "property" is an
unhelpful metaphor, as intellectual property is more like
regulation than physical property.64 According to Lemley, the
scope of intellectual property should be determined on the
margins, and innovators should only be granted intellectual
property rights entitling them to consume as much of the positive
externalities or "spillovers" generated by their innovation, as are
necessary to provide the marginal incentive to innovate. "We are
better off with the traditional utilitarian explanation for
intellectual property, because it at least attempts to strike an
appropriate balance between control by inventors and creators
and the baseline norm of competition."6 5
Of course, this is also true of property law in relation to
physical property. Property law is always a system of regulation.
The problem is that the metaphor of property relies on heuristics
derived in relation to physical property, which is rivalrous and
excludable. As a consequence, it naturalizes rules that tend to be
efficient in relation to the regulation of goods that are rivalrous
and excludable. But those same heuristics may suggest less
efficient rules when the goods in question are non-excludable or
non-rivalrous. For example, when applied to common pool
resources, they may help normalize rules that benefit
incumbents, at the expense of the public. And when applied to
public goods like innovation, they may help normalize rules that
benefit producers, at the expense of the public.
Metaphors are powerful when they mobilize heuristics.
Intellectual property metaphors resonate with the justification
for physical property and with heuristics around the enforcement
of social norms. It feels natural that if you create something, you
are entitled to consume some of the social surplus you generate,
and that if you create something profitable based on something
created by someone else, they ought to be entitled to share in the
proceeds. Of course, while these heuristics and intuitions produce
reasonably efficient property rules when applied to rivalrous
62 Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain
Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1369 (2004).
63 Id.
64 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1036-37 (2005); see also Tom W. Bell, Author's Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory
Mechanism for Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 258 (2003).
65 Lemley, supra note 64, at 1032.
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goods, they are poorly calculated to produce efficient rules when
applied to the non-rivalrous goods protected by intellectual
property.
However, intellectual property metaphors provide the best of
both worlds for rent seekers. They enable rent seekers to rely on
the ostensible welfarist justification for intellectual property, in
order to claim that it is efficient in theory, without actually ever
considering what the efficient scope and term of intellectual
property actually is. And they enable intellectual property
owners to draw on moral intuitions intellectual property
ownership, without being obligated to actually justify the scope
and duration of intellectual property in moral terms.
In order to understand intellectual property, we must
abandon intellectual property metaphors, and evaluate
intellectual property in welfarist terms. Of course, it is probably
impossible to abandon metaphor entirely, because it performs
such a fundamental role in our conceptual systems. 66 But we can
certainly adopt metaphors that emphasize the welfarist
justification of intellectual property, rather than obscuring it. For
example, we could use the metaphor of "privilege" rather than
"property" to describe those rights.67 Or we could use the
metaphor of "charity" to think of the relationship between
innovators and the public.68
CONCLUSION
While the justification for intellectual property is welfarist,
intellectual property rhetoric is overwhelmingly metaphorical.
Intellectual property metaphors encourage us to understand and
experience intellectual property in terms of physical property.
And they obscure the welfarist justification for intellectual
property by encouraging us to draw on heuristics drawn from
physical property. Those heuristics are inefficient, because
physical property is rivalrous and intellectual property is not.
66 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 210-211.
67 See generally TOM BELL, INTELLECTUAL PRIVILEGE: COPYRIGHT, COMMON LAW,
AND THE COMMON GOOD (2014).
68 Brian L. Frye, Copyright as Charity, 39 NOVA L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
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